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Abstract 
In the following, we take into consideration, firstly, the specifics on the phenomenological analysis of conscience by referring 
to the thematic offered by Descartes, Kant and Fichte, namely by those who influenced Husserl in favouring "the 
transcendental reason" in the philosophical research. For Husserl, the subjective conscience is intentional conscience, and 
existence is assumed as an existential phenomenon, as an objectual set with sense in conscience. Under these conditions, one 
of the fundamental preoccupations of pure phenomenology lies in the explanation of sense from the constituent 
intentionality's perspective that characterizes both the personal transcendental ego and the transcendental intersubjectivity: in 
fact, the objective sense of the world is intersubjectively developed, only that the transcendental intersubjectivity, as an 
originary structure for all that exists as a sense, has its focus in the self, in any self, which means that in order to thematize it 
methodically, it is necessary to start from the transcendental ego.  In addition, as the philosopher will state in later works, the 
world, as an existential phenomenon, is rich in significations that the subject perpetuates or transforms: there is always, for 
everyone, a predetermined horizon of sense, and on the other side, our subjective conscience always comes with an excess of 
sense. 
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As it is already known, Kant is the philosopher who himself named his doctrine transcendental philosophy, 
transcendental idealism. Afterwards, Fichte will name his own 'science doctrine,' which is a philosophy of the 
self, a transcendental idealism too; Schelling will understand by transcendental idealism his own attempt to 
merge his previous philosophy of nature with the fichtean doctrine of the self. In the 20th century, Husserl will 
also try to define his phenomenology as transcendental idealism. Of course, the meanings of transcendental 
idealism suffer important specifications in the process of passing from a doctrine to another. As far as Kant is 
concerned, he promoted a form of an idealism indissolubly merged with an empiric realism, which forbids 
considering the phenomenal world as an arbitrary creation of conscience.  See, on this topic, his speech on 
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transcendental ideality and the empirical reality of space and time. Thus, Kant will oppose, both the dogmatic 
idealism of Berkeley, that supports the thesis of dependence of things to their perception (see Kant's critique from 
Prolegomena), as well as the sceptical idealism supported by Descartes. If for Descartes the knowledge of 
existence is, in order of certainty, dependent on self cognition, for Kant, in opposition, the 'external experience' 
holds the cognitive primacy in relation to the 'internal experience,' because any knowledge starts with the impact 
of experience's objects on ourselves. This does not lead, of course, to the dogmatic assertion of the ontological 
primacy of the external world. In this context, Kant refuses both the dogmatic realism, for which cognition 
implies subordination to the alleged 'objective reality of things,' and the transcendental realism, for which only 
the 'conditions of possibility of things' are real, or, in other versions, those inspired by the medieval thinking, in 
the self of world, of things.  
For Husserl, the transcendental idealism regards, most of the time, as it is shown in Cartesian meditations[1], 
the self-explanation of the transcendental self, in its quality of sense developer for any existence, self-explanation 
accompanied by the 'notice' of the intersubjective sub-layer of the transcendental ego  as a nucleus of 
conscience's life; more precisely, the true issue of this new type of transcendental idealism is the explanation of 
self from the perspective of developing intentionality which characterizes both the transcendental ego and the 
transcendental intersubjectivity. The transcendental idealism proposed by Husserl is named 'pure 
phenomenology' which, as it is affirmed in Logical researches (1901), represents a domain of the neutral 
research, in which different sciences have their roots  revealin the origins from which the concepts and 
principles of formal logic result, on which all knowledge is based  [2]. We must specify that, subsequently, the 
meanings assigned to phenomenology will enrich. In Logical researches [2]¸ Husserl states that classical logic 
regards the issue of a judgment's truth, not of its sense. This is why a transcendental logic is necessary, meant to 
reveal the basis, the nature of sense, of fo it clarifies, in other words, the basis from the nature 
of the sense, of the logical reason, of every reason (logical, practical - moral etc.) [...] Only a logic that takes into 
consideration judgment as activity and as subjective life is a truth's logic - understood as a science of subjectivity 
that is knowing and operating, in general. This kind of logic can only be phenomenology. It is a science and, at 
the same time, a philosophia prim [3]. From these definitions, we can conclude that at the level of his work 
from 1901 [2], ,  
(meaning enriched in Philosophy as Rigurous Science, philosophia prima  In the husserlian works 
that follow, the focus falls especially on this statement: according to the transcendental idealism, any object of 
cognition must allow to be brought to the phase of a 'given' of experience, but cognition does not end with this. 
By engaging a 'critique of the experience' in which the given presents itself, it can be shown that the given is 
subordinated to a sense that is formed on the level of conscience. Because of this, the experimental method of 
sciences must imply, preceding it logically and epistemologically, what no experiment can provide: conscience 
analysis. But, this means, according to Husserl, the identification of the basis of experience data  regarding the 
sense this bears  on the level of transcendental subjectivity, identification that is possible to achieve only 
through the phenomenological method.  
The phenomenological method aims at separating 'the immanent given of conscience' of what it receives from 
the outside, which is considered 'transcendent' (by 'transcendence' Husserl understands the way an object is 
presented in general). Through the phenomenological method, Husserl proposes to go over the way of the 
perceived world, the natural world, to the 'last foundation structures,' which are 'essences' accessible only to a 
'categorial intuition.' Actually, this concerns a series of 'putting between parenthesis' (a sort of taking out of 
consideration), by which the 'matter' of this knowledge is left outside consideration, in order to reach a form. It 
concerns a rise from the object determined as phenomenon to concept (eidos), then to the perception of the clear 
intention in an objective content (noema) and, finally, to the perception of the intentional act itself (noesa). The 
transcendental reduction is meant to turn the man's eye from nature to the transcendental conscience. What is left 
after any reduction is the transcendental ego, considered to be constituent for any reality, because it gives sense to 
it. The philosopher adds that the reduction allows us to notice how the transcendence of the object can be 
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transcendence in the immanence of the subject. What does this mean? In Logical researches [2], Husserl stated 
that it is absurd to try to separate the intentional object (immanent) from the 'real' (transcendental) one: they are 
fundamentally linked together. My conscience  the philosopher states in Cartesian Meditations[1]  cannot be 
thought if, in an imaginary way, we remove that thing to which the conscience belongs to. As conscience is 
intentionality, the reduction can be done without losing what is reduced; the reduction is, actually, the 
transformation of every given into a phenomenon with sense, in the intentional conscience. 
 As it is already known, Edmund Husserl tended to see sometimes in Descartes, other times in Kant and 
Fichte, his true predecessors, stating that these great figures of modernity have determined him to favour the 
'transcendental reason' in approaching cognition. According to Husserl, Descartes was the one that initiated a 
philosophy that would be, at the same time, both science and basis for sciences - in the system of a universal 
science. Husserl starts from the Cartesian cogito, which will be understood as a transcendental subject [1]. Except 
that Descartes envisions 'a philosophy with two focuses: the cogito and God.' Because of that, Descartes must be 
outrun through destruction. While for Descartes God transcends the cogito, for Husserl, the ego transcends the 
alter-ego; instead of resorting to the 'divine truth'  in order to ensure a superior basis for truth and objectivity of 
knowledge (Descartes), Husserl will search a similar basis in a philosophy of intersubjectivity, one that develops 
gradually, more precisely, by developing the problems that concern the first four meditations. 
In the case of the transcendental idealism, Kant was, of course, the first to point out the essential role of 
conscience's unity in all the cognitive synthesis that thinking realizes in the sensitive cognition. What Kant 
named 'the synthetic unity of the transcendental apperception' represents the ultimate condition of any 
knowledge, of any synthesis. In these conditions, Kant takes into consideration the transcendental self as a 
functional unity of the synthesis of representations in conscience. The philosophy of self, by Fichte, has its 
starting point exactly in this Kantian idea of the 'synthetic unity of the transcendental apperception.' The whole 
knowledge, not only its forms  just as in Kant's opinion  but its content too, is the product of our spiritual 
activity. What is, then, the foundation of this activity? It is the act through which the Self forms itself. Before 
knowledge itself, which implies the subject - object duality, the Self must exist, and it cannot exist without self-
developing. Preceding experience and knowledge, this self-development, according to Fichte, has a metaphysical 
character. On these conditions, regular knowledge is outdated by philosophy, because only the philosopher, by 
intellectual intuition, has access to the self-learning of the Self. Secondly, the Self develops the non-self, namely 
the world; at this level the duality of subject with object appears, knowledge and conscience being established. 
The two moments we talked about represent the thesis and the antithesis, and their synthesis is expressed as 
follows: the Self opposes inside the Self a divisible Non-Self. This means that, by mutual limitation, the Self and 
the Non-Self are reunited, thus coming back to the original unity and asserting itself as Absolute Self. On these 
conditions, the metaphysical Hegelian conception over the Self is already announced. We must add that the 
Fichtean perspective on the absolute self evolves towards mysticism, and, according to it, the Self is the Divine 
logos itself, manifested both as Existence, Liberty and Truth. See, s comments on John's 
Gospel, as well as the statements from the Theological - political Treaty from 1807. 
According to the considerations of Denis Fisette [4] for the course about Fichte held between 1915 and 1918, 
Husserl, after assigning his predecessor the merit of having tried to solve the difficulties concerning the 
distinction between the empirical self and the transcendental self, reproaches the great predecessor that he had 
made the transcendental ego a metaphysical, void postulate. Beside these statements, he will add  against the 
German idealism  the fact that the phenomenological psychology represents, on one side, a privileged access 
point to the transcendental philosophy, and, on the other side, an intentional psychology; this is the only one that 
has the task of elaborating the fundamental intentional concepts that are necessary for the study of pure 
subjectivity, namely the transcendental self that is sense constitutive. In The Crisis of the European Sciences [5], 
he mainly focused on this issue, he fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and  
pointing out that this separation is exactly what led the successors of Kant to an obscure metaphysics. In the same 
manner, in a text meant for the British Enciclopedia [4], Husserl presents his phenomenology as having a double 
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meaning: firstly, it is a transcendental phenomenology, with a prime philosophical function, in the traditional 
sense of the term; secondly, it is defined as intentional psychology, its task being to serve as propaedeutics for the 
first meaning. In the first case, phenomenology is the universal science, the founding science of every possible 
science; as we already stated, as intentional psychology, it has a methodological value and it interferes, in the 
eidetic reduction, making possible the access to the transcendental ego. Fichte had chosen a direct approach, 
through knowledge, to the metaphysical transcendental ego, which, in its founding perspective, appeared as given 
in an apodictic and adequate evidence or intuition; Husserl, on the contrary, shows that the indirect approach of 
phenomenological reduction (towards the transcendental ego) is guided not only by the apodicticity's ideal  
reached through categorical intuition  but, firstly, by the world of experience that implies explanations by 
resorting to the intentional psychology [4]. 
As we already stated, this indirect approach remains faithful to the spirit of a philosophy that, far from making 
the transcendental ego a metaphysical postulate, a double of the empirical self, it also implies that the nucleus of 
the intentional conscience is operating at a knowledge of self level, empirical, namely at the development of 
psychic self level. We point out that, the so-called psychological reduction does not offer access to the self 
transcendental dimension inherent to the ego, access possible only through a categorical institution. Let's remind, 
Rigorous Science [6]:  
With this we meet a science whose extraordinary extent our contemporaries have, yet, no concept for; a science, it is true, of consciousness 
that is still not psychology; a phenomenology of consciousness as opposed to a natural science about consciousness. But since there will be no 
question here of an accidental equivocation, it is to be expected beforehand that phenomenology and psychology must stand in close 
relationship to each other, since both are concerned with consciousness, even though in a different way, according to a different orientation. 
This we may express by saying that psychology is concerned with empirica consciousness, with consciousness from the empirical point of 
view, as an empirical being in the ensemble of nature, whereas  phenomenology is concerned with pure consciousness, i.e.,  consciousness 
from the phenomenological point of view ].  
As a reply to the 'formal constructivism' of Kant, but also to the anti-psychologism expressed by Fichte in his  
Doctrine of Science, Husserl will state that philosophy is meant to retrieve the intelligible - connected to the 
transcendental nucleus of intentional conscience's life, which is possible starting from a low level and intuitively 
progressing to the constituent operations of conscience 6]. But, this includes the meanings of intentional 
psychology. In the end, as D. Fisette affirms, Husserl states that what intentional psychology and transcendental 
phenomenology treat  for example the ego  is identical on an ontological level  that is in content  and that the 
essential difference for phenomenology is a purely epistemological one. Here interferes an ontological monism, 
the same descriptum, but also a dualism in the explanation, a one and only ego having the possibility of being the 
object of both a psychological and transcendental explanation. On these conditions, the process starts from the 
empirical self, in order to make an intuitive categorical observation of the transcendental ego; this value resides 
in its propedeutical function for the transcendental phenomenology. Referring to Fichte, we must also keep in 
mind his influence on the understanding of self as action, as liberty  concept that for Husserl will become the 
idea of formation. By this, Husserl absorbs from this predecessor the idea of primacy of the practical reason over 
the theoretical one. For all these reasons, Husserl considers himself entitled to praise Fichte's transcendentalism, 
and, in particular, his contribution to the formation's phenomenology, but, at the same time, to reproach him his 
predilection for the 'mythical formations.' 
Of all of these, we understand that Husserl's philosophy, although influenced by some of his predecessors  
especially German  appears and evolves in a particular manner of the transcendental idealism, one of the issues 
that settles its specificity being exactly the one that we will refer to in the following section: the issue of 
intersubjectivity seen from the structure's perspective and the significations of the transcendental ego. It is clear 
for Husserl that, in order to be able to speak about the existence of intersubjective relations in social 
communities, firstly we must take into consideration the conditions of possibility which have a transcendental 
nature, of their formation. The enunciation of a transcendental theory of intersubjectivity, from the perspective of 
'sense formation,' and not a detailed examination of the actual sociality, means for Husserl the research of what 
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makes possible the sense determinations of the world, objectivity  the sense of existence that is independent 
from me and can be distinguished both from me and the other  the sharing of sense in a community, thus, 
communication, etc. As it is stated in the manuscripts from 1912-1935, published under the title Zur 
Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität [7], the process of development (forming) is not a causal one, in which the 
subject would make objects possible or would assign sense to them: through the phenomenological development 
nothing is created, nothing is born. On the contrary, the development does not express anything else that the 
rocess of bringing towa  it must be taken into consideration from the perspective of the noetic - 
noematic relation, because it concerns a process with two roots (talking about Fichte's influence): the originary 
self and the originary non-self, since subjectivity and the world  as an existential phenomenon  form a unity, 
which, at a transcendental life's level, expresses the unity of the transcendental development itself. In another 
manuscript, Husserl a The life of the actual primordial self is, on one side, shared according to the actual 
isolated self,  [intersubjectively], as far as the intentionality of each actual life bears 
in itself an intentional mediation [...], one that does not reach only as far as the self's actual life lies and gives it 
unity [...], but also forms the transcendental unity of the intersubjective presence and of the intermonadic 
temporality - of all monades [7] . 
Somehow close to these affirmations, in Cartesian Meditations [1], Husserl adds an extremely important 
observation: human existence as such is always related consciously to an existent practical word, a surrounding 
world already endowed with humanly significant predicates, and this relationship presupposes a psychological 
constitution of such predicates. Every such predicate of the world accrues from a temporal genesis, indeed, one 
that is rooted in human undergoing and doing, needs no proof.   In other words, the world, as an existential 
phenomenon, is abundant in significations, which the subject perpetuates or transforms: there is always a 
predetermined horizon of sense and, on the other side, our conscience always comes with an excess of sense. But, 
this sends us to the perception of the relation between the transcendental ego and the transcendental 
intersubjectivity and, by default, to the recognition of the fact that the personal transcendental ego is not 
responsible for the whole richness of sense of the world;  for this, the intervention of subjectivity of the other is 
always needed. This is the transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute foundation of being 
[Seinsboden], from which signification and validation of everything that exists objectively originates  [8]. When 
we speak about the transcendental development we also speak, by default, about the transcendental sense of alien 
subjects and, as a consequence, about a universal layer of rooting from them, makes possible for 
 [7]. This means that, in the 'self sphere' we find determinations already given to our 
being and, thus, to every human being. What concerns us is, on the contrary, an essential structure, which is part 
of the all  embracing constitution in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an Objective world, lives his 
life  [1]. The personal ego does not deduce the world from itself, but develops it based on what is already given 
to it, according to its transcendental-intersubjective conscience. Later on, in The Crisis of the European Sciencei 
[5], the philosopher will consolidate these considerations, firmly stating that subjectivity is what it is, a 
constituent functional ego  only in the frame of intersubjectivity. It is, thus, necessary to appeal to the 
signification of the transcendental intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity that forms (understands and offers) sense 
to the world  for all  and in whose content I appear as well, but only as a transcendental self among others, 
while the transcendental function is exercised by 'us all.' Only that,  
it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental intersubjectivity ,  the ego of my epochs, 
which can never lose its uniqueness and personal undeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to this that the ego  through a particular 
constitutive accomplishment of its own  makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes 
transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely,  among the transcendental others. 
This is what philosophical self  exposition in the epochs actually teaches us  [5]. 
What does this mean? In the first place, it concerns the fact that intersubjectivity can 'exist' only as a relation 
between singular subjects; afterwards, as we already stated, any ego  as a sphere of existence  has an 
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intersubjective structure: in the development of self, as psyché and as person, an originary reference to other 
transcendental egos is always necessary; the subjective intentional conscience, whose nucleus (the transcendental 
ego) revealed through phenomenological reduction is 'a field of the transcendental experience,' takes part itself in 
a 'world for all' intersubjectively developed. At the same time, the transcendental intersubjectivity, as an originary 
structure for everything that exists as sense, has its focus on self, on every self, which means that in order to 
separate it into themes, we must proceed from the transcendental ego. This is what Husserl himself does in 
Cartesian Meditations [1]. Assuming systematically the risk of solipsism, at the end of the fourth meditation he 
will have to state that, since any transcendental reality is self's life itself, phenomenology represents self 
explanation: the self is not just the 'subject' pole opposite to the 'object' pole; it is the embedding element: 
everything is a product of the transcendental subjectivity. Or this means solipsism. The fifth meditation will show 
however that, without being a dead-end, the tr a passing point of philoso  [1]. 
As a matter of fact, in the second meditation, Husserl stated that erhaps the reduction to the transcendental ego 
only seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science, in 
accordance with its own sense, leads to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of 
this, to a universal transcendental philosophy 1].  
Considered a headstone of the transcendental phenomenology, the fifth cartesian meditation concerns the 
specificity of the alterity's existence and of the signification of intersubjectivity in knowledge and 
communication, in order to offer an opening towards a 'lifeworld,' a common one that can be formed by the 
transcendental subjectivity only by referring to the other's horizon. Under these conditions, the nucleus of this 
meditation rises the problem of forming the sense of 'the other,' formation that goes, as we already showed, 
through the test of the objection of solipsism, objection undertaken as argument: I decide to research only what is 
specific to me, excluding the others, because only by knowing what is specific to me I can understand the self of 
someone else. Thus, the sense of 'self' is transfered from me to the other, and this can be done when (because of 
the founding intersubjectivity, but also in an environment that implies the existence of the personal self) many of 
the signs of a transcendence towards the other can be spotted. As a matter of fact,  the person represents for 
Husserl a nucleus of interiorization of different worlds and only in relation with the person can we raise the issue 
of forming 'a lifeworld:' communities are communities of persons that have specific cultural objects. 
From what we have said so far, we can infer that the phenomenological reduction, with all its consequences, is 
not responsible for the whole richness of sense of the world, as the presence of the other's subjectivity is always 
necessary. Therefore, in the last part of the fifth meditation [1], Husserl states that we need a new concept, die 
Lebenswelt, the lifeworld; only the development of a layer of fundamental sense can be explained by an egologist 
transcendental attitude: one has to proceed to the observation of the already developed layers in the field of the 
Lebeswelt, those that maintain my possibility of giving sense to things that appear to me as phenomena in 
conscience. Let us point out that, alongside the Lebenswelt, Husserl's phenomenology will evolve as 
intersubjective, generative phenomenology. In this phase, the philosopher's research stops being limited to the 
observation of the transcendental ego's possibilities,  Husserl wishing to thematize the possibility issue and the 
effects of communication on a cultural-historical level. 
In a later work, The phenomenology of the communication community, Husserl will treat the issue of the 
communication with the other. Let us point out that the phenomenological approach of the communication issue 
does not start from the structures of language or from the study of  competence, but from the 
analysis of conscience's intentional acts (as we already noticed), grammar of 
communication  [5]. This is because, for Husserl in his late works, communication means sense 
sharing.  
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The content of each act of communication is the intention of determining in the other a certain behaviour; receiving this intention, the other 
manifests, generally, a double behaviour: one determined by the content of communication, and a metacommunicational behaviour, through 
which he manifests his attitude towards the content of communication: acceptance, rejection, conflict. Regardless of the type of reactions to 
the intention of communication, the two interlocutors not only remain one by the other; through empathy, as an apperception of the other's 
intentionality, of his spirituality, my own internal experiences are reflected in an alter ego, that can be found beyond my own sphere. The 
empathy relation comes along with language, thus communication means addressed and received discourse  [9].  
Thus, the possibility and the reasons of communication are given by the intentional development, through 
analogy and presentation, of the meaning of 'other,' but its actual realisation, that of communication, implies, as 
Husserl states, the discourse. Briefly said, the acts of discourse mediate, actually, the development of a 
community of persons: I turn towards another person, the other 'self' that becomes a 'you.' In as far as it is 
understood as another 'self,' he is, also, a subject of the action of addressing  listening to a discourse. I see the 
other as the one who addresses me the word, so, as the one who communicates me a certain wish or a will, 
according to my behaviour. If I am the one who addresses, then I see the other as the one who listens to me, the 
one who has access to my communication. I do not make my acts of communications alone, but the realisation of 
these acts motivates in the other a certain co-realisation, that of receiving the acts of communication, that of 
having access to my communication's intention.   
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